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Abstract 
In less developed countries such as Kenya trade is increasingly occurring through, and 
employment is found within, global and local value chains. Yet, although innovation is widely 
recognised as crucial for development, the endogenous relationship between small-scale 
innovations and participation in global value chains (GVCs) has yet to be explored sufficiently. 
ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ řȂȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
overlapping factors that affect both the processes of innovation as well as GVC participation. 
Drawing on a survey of 320 fresh fruit farmers and 55 interviews in Kenya, we develop a novel 
method to quantify small-scale agricultural innovations, which are categorised into two 
overarching types. The first formal, emanate from meeting standard requirements; the second, 
informal, evolve from local contexts and are less codified. We find that GVC farmers perform 
more formal innovations, while local farmers perform similar levels of informal innovation to 
GVC farmers. 
  
1. Introduction 
Global value chains (GVCs), the inter-firm linkages involved in production from raw 
material supply through to final retail, are increasingly recognised as the architecture 
of the global economy (Gereffi et al., 2005). Such GVCs are coordinated by global lead 
firms, often from the global North, who govern such trade relationships. Standards 
are recognised as crucial in global value chains. Yet those suppliers who are unable to 
cope with these standards tend to get marginalized (Nadvi, 2008). A significant body 
of research has explored the development possibilities for Southern farms and firms 
from integrating into GVCs.  
More recently, domestic and regional markets and value chains have expanded in the 
global South, often coordinated by Southern lead firms and new public and private 
standards. Thus, research has begun to explore the governance and development 
outcomes that arise from such chains (Horner and Nadvi, 2017). Although such outlets 
provide farmers with options to diversify, such end markets, also demand acquisition 
of new skills to comply with southern standards. Thus, an increased possibility of 
marginalization from supplying Southern lead firms also arises (Pickles et al., 2016).  
Parallel to trends around integration into the global economy, the importance of 
innovation has been increasingly recognised. In largely separate discussions to that on 
value chains, research has explored the opportunities and challenges for innovation 
in the global South. A ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃ ȱ o the world 
ȄȱȱȱȱȱȱǻLall, 1987; Viotti, 2002). Yet, with 
lower cost technologies, techniques and the growing presence of ICT, there is potential 
for wider-understood innovation at all stages of production, across a diverse set of 
actors (Kaplinsky et al., 2009).  
Yet until recently, although both are recognised as important, the relationship 
between participating in GVCs and innovation has rarely been explored (Lundvall et 
al. 2014). Recent research which has begun to explore this relationship (e.g. Lundvall 
et al., 2014, Parrilli et al., 2013, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011) has suggested that it is 
non-linear and endogenous. As we will explore, changing market dynamics are 
mandating innovation. While ȃnational innovation systemsȄǰȱȱthe key actors, 
institutions and linkages related to innovation within a national context are often 
focused on, it is important to consider global networks as a key source of knowledge 
and technology for innovation. From a value chain perspective, the consideration of 
innovation can help provide deeper insights into the variety of activities associated 
with participating in global trade. 
This paper focuses on small-scale innovations, which are characterised by adaptation, 
novel incremental change or technology appropriation. Small-scale innovations are 
comparable in scale to frugal innovations (Prabhu and Jain, 2015). Although frugal 
innovations rely on aligning priorities of lead firms with grassroot actors to create 
win/win solutions (Knorringa et al., 2016), with asymmetric power relations within 
value chains, and diverging priorities of lead firms (Krauss and Krishnan 2016), 
collaborative relationships are often not possible. This is exacerbated by the fact that 
some arguments in favour of frugal innovations have tended to position small-scale 
innovation as relatively spontaneous and self-guided by entrepreneurs. Thus, in this 
study we look at innovation as small-scale, which allows for fleshing out the 
underlying processes of absorption, and adaptation and diffusion (Berdegué et al., 
2008). We have little knowledge of when and under what conditions small-scale 
innovation more readily occurs, potentially limiting our ability to transfer studies of 
innovation and development into coherent evidence-driven policy advice. In this 
paper, using a relational framework thereby helps nuance frugal innovation, making 
it more inclusive and broadening the remit of how we understand frugal innovation.  
The aim is to develop a quantitative framework to explore the links between value chains and 
small-scale innovation in an agricultural context. Even with a revived emphasis on 
industrialisation, the agricultural sector is crucial in many countries, especially in the 
global South, and also acts as a key food supplier to the global North (Neilson and 
Pritchard 2009). Equally, given that agriculture tends to include a higher proportion 
of low-income and precarious workers, the sector is crucial for more inclusive 
development. This work uses a mixed-method approach by drawing on an empirical 
survey of 320 fresh fruit (avocado and mango) farmers and 55 interviews in Meru and 
Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ-scale agricultural innovation. 
We take farmers as an entry point into the global value chain, and unpack the key 
characteristics of the innovations that they perform and the varied factors that 
promote innovation. However, with the growing importance of domestic markets, we 
econometrically analyse farmer innovations in local value chains, and how they 
compared with those in global value chains, demonstrating heterogeneity across 
different chains. To our knowledge, this is one of the first studies that attempts to 
measure small-scale innovation and explicate the endogenous relationship it has with 
global and local value chains.  
The remainder of the paper is set out as follows. Firstly, we introduce the literature on 
changing perspectives on small-scale innovation, highlighting how participating in a 
particular value chain alters the processes of how small-scale innovation is achieved 
and identifying what we call ȱřȂȱ- learning, labels and linkages - that help drive 
small-scale innovation. In section 3, we outline the novel research approach we 
developed and used to quantify innovation. We outline details of the sampling and 
analysis in section 4. In section 5 we highlight core findings, and the econometric 
results in section 6, followed by linking the results to broader debates and policy 
implications in Section 7. 
 
2. Small-scale innovations, value chains and the 3L framework 
Value chains and small-scale innovations can be seen as co-evolving. Indeed, 
Pietrobelli and Rabelotti (2011 p.1261) argued that Ȅȱȱ ȱ	ȱȱ
IS [innovation systems] ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȄǯ While 
the seminal research of Morrison et al. (2008) and Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011) has 
focused on manufacturing industries, studying innovation of lead firms and large 
suppliers in GVCs, our research attempts to unravel this co-evolutionary and 
endogenous process in the agricultural sector, focusing on farmers. This is one of the 
first studies to our knowledge that systematically unpacks this relationship across 
farmers in global and local value chains.  
When studying the agricultural sector, some important contextual factors need to be 
noted. Studies of innovation, especially related to agriculture, have moved away from 
conceptualising innovation as one-time disruptive change to focusing more on 
indigenous knowledge and incremental changes. Indeed, a growing literature 
emphasises the importance of small-scale innovation in key practices and products in 
agriculture in developing countries (e.g. Spielman, 2005, Knickel et al., 2009). This 
means that small-scale innovation is centred on developing incremental innovations 
that enable meeting prescribed standards. Small-scale innovations have been explored 
within a number of sub-fields such as inclusive-, frugal-, jugaad-, grassroots- and 
responsible-innovation. For example, instead of investing in an expensive greenhouse, 
farmers build make-shift greenhouses with nets and sticks in rural Kenya.   
Much literature on innovation has centred on technology absorption as a key aspect 
of development (Lall and Pietrobelli, 2002, Bell, 2006). As new technologies and 
techniques emerge, actors in the global South need to build know-how to allow for 
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȱ ȱ
Ȃȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱhe successful circulation of innovations. That is to 
say, farmers inherently innovate when they are mandated to use new technologies, or 
follow complex processes in order to continue their livelihoods. This is akin to the 
conclusions of Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011:1267) who found that LDC firms 
innovate based on their participation in GVCs as they have to prescribe to complex 
standards and requirements, and that developing efficient IS systems reduces the 
complexity of the requirement. This is the starting point which we use when 
developing the first genre of small-scale innovation linked to farmers in value chains- 
 ȱ ȱȱȁȱȂȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
i.e. be it through standards or labels, or codes of conduct, which involve a range of 
complex transactions, and which are codified to different degrees by lead firms and 
other actors within the value chain. Innovation here is more actively undertaken as 
farmers look to adhere to requirements and norms in order to access specific global 
markets (Korzun et al. 2014). For example, farmers may use and adapt rainwater 
harvesting techniques as part of achieving environmental standards. They may also 
incorporate new seed varieties into their farming cycles to ensure their produce can 
be sold into global markets. 
Furthermore, it is increasingly untenable to describe innovative activities as solely 
coming from prescriptive requirements within GVCs. Innovative activities are also 
likely to include not only explicit innovations passed through the GVC but also 
incremental, indigenous, inclusive, frugal and small-scale innovations based upon 
tacit learning, and adaptation to local conditions and needs, that are not necessarily 
linked into standards within value chains (STEPS Centre, 2010, Foster and Heeks 
2013). Small-scale innovation has often been seen as a relatively spontaneous or 
informal ȁȱȱ Ȃȱ as part of seeking ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
Ȅȱ(Knickel et al. 2009: 134). For farmers, for example, small improvements 
in waste water storage to promote biodiversity on their farms or novel modes of crop 
management are arguably as important to their livelihoods as disruptive 
mechanisation technologies (Raina, 2009). Other examples have been documented 
where equipment is adapted or modified to fit with local needs such as in the case of 
adapting small-scale milling devices to fit with local crop varieties (Manyati, 2014, 
Abrol & Gupta, 2014). Thus, these types of innovations have higher degrees of local 
ȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȁȱȂǯȱ 
This broader perspective of drivers and facilitators of small scale innovations also 
provides an important basis for extending frugal innovation literature. Frugal 
innovations are characterized as low cost, good enough innovations which better 
consider the needs of the poor (Knorringa et al. 2016, Radjou & Prabhu 2014, Zeschky 
et al. 2011). Typically large firms are seen as key enablers of innovation but a model 
of polycentric innovation also includes actors who develop locally appropriate 
innovations (Beers et al. 2014).  
In this perspective, however, emphasis on grassroots innovations tends to focus on 
ȱȁȱȂȱȱȱȱȱȱparticular contexts, yet 
without substantial consideration of ȱȁȱȂȱȱȱȱ
related to the relations between polycentric innovators (Foster & Heeks 2014). Aligned 
with this critique, definitions of frugal innovation often forefront product innovation 
(Knorringa et al. 2016, Pesa 2015) over process, organisational and business model 
innovation. This product focus may underplay some of the potentially more contested 
and power laden aspects of innovation that relate to the relationships between these 
innovators. If, as Knorringa (2016) argues, it is still unclear whether frugal innovations 
lead to capȱ¡ȱȱȁȱȂǰȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
unpack the links between production relationships and inclusive innovation through 
this study of agriculture. This paper attempts to develop a novel process to measure 
small-scale, formal and informal innovation as explicated in detail in section 3 and 
empirically explored in section 5.  
In order to explore the endogenous links between innovations and value chains, we 
build on recent work in this vein (Morrisson et al., 2008, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 
2011) to isolate three critical aspects relating to small-scale innovations, which we refer 
ȱȱřȱȃȂȄ- ǰȱȱȱǯȱȱȱȱřȂȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
innovations as well as value chains and thus are key underlying factors that are 
instrumental in elucidating the processes through which farmers in GVCs and LVCs 
innovate and how these are co-evolutionary in nature.  
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁabelsȂǰȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ  which ȱ ȁexpert 
¢Ȃȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
(product and/or process) has been reached (Nadvi 2008, Ponte and Ewert 2009, Evers 
et al., 2014). Various research has shown that standards act as entry barriers for 
farmers in GVCs and can cause marginalization (e.g. Tallontire et al., 2011), especially 
because they comprise of a series of complex control points such as traceability, post 
and pre-harvest measures. For instance, a study by Okello et al. (2011) showed that six 
control points linked to shifting to safer pesticide, pesticide storage, traceability, 
pesticide disposal pits, charcoal coolers and grading sheds, were prime causes for 
Kenyan farmerȂ exclusion from high value vegetable chains exporting to Europe. 
Furthermore, the growing importance of standards within regional and local markets 
also suggests marginalisation processes may emerge similar to those that have 
emerged from selling into the global North (Pickles et al., 2016, Krishnan, 2017). 
In terms of linkages, value chains and innovation system institutions are also quite 
different in agriculture (compared to manufacturing) as they move away from 
traditional state actors and institutions such as R&D and universities towards a wider 
set of local intermediaries, community groups and extension officers (Raina, 2009, 
STEPS Centre, 2010). Thus, when studying innovation from a farmer perspective in 
value chains, linkages are defined as the relationships (or ties) between dyads in a 
network of actors, be they individual (at varying scales) or organizational (Gereffi 
1999, Henderson et al., 2002). In this paper, we move away from the governance 
typology of markets, captive, relational, modular and hierarchy as discussed by 
Gereffi et al. (2005) and focus on backward (input suppliers) and forward (with 
buyers) linkages, because we are unpacking mico-linkages across horticulture only. 
These relationships can be strong, i.e. high quality and dense, or weak and sparse 
(Granovetter, 1973, Gulati, 1995). Furthermore, such relationships can also involve 
trust, which is related to the longevity and the strength of the tie (Uzzi, 1996). By using 
ȱȱȂȱǻŘŖŗŚǼȱȱȱ-linkages i.e. dyadic relationships, we make 
the farmer the reference point of the analysis, and map all the dyadic relations 
accordingly.  
Learning forms an integral part of innovation and its diffusion. Innovation system 
literature has looked at learning, in terms of both the introduction of physical 
technologies as well as the social technologies to produce, at the scalȱȱȱȁȂȱ
(Nelson, 2004) as well as the region.  From this interpretation, it is argued that all 
ȱȱȱ ȱȃnational trajectories of innovativeness, technology orientation 
and learningȄȱ ȱ ȱ ȃeach nation, less or highly developed, has some kind of 
National Innovation System1, no matter if working well or notȄȱǻ-Eisebeth 
2007:219). Thus, when overlaying this with value chains and looking at it from the 
reference point of the farmer, we can nuance and extend learning- to the level of the 
farmer. 
Within value chain literature a key source of learning comes through direct transfer 
or knowledge spillovers linked to the networks which firms and other relevant actors 
are linked into (Parrilli et al. 2013, Pietrobelli and Rabellotti 2011). This suggests that 
how GVCs operate in terms of knowledge, technology and learning is a key 
consideration in innovation. A particularly good example of this literature is the 
insightful framework developed by Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (ibid). Drawing on the 
classic typology of GVC governance, they discuss and illustrate how different modes 
of learning in the value chain (via. standards, imitation, knowledge spillovers, face-
to-face) vary across value chain governance (ibid).   
We define ȁlearningȂ as a process of acquisition, accumulation and appropriation of 
tacit and explicit knowledge (Ernst and Kim 2002, Gertler 2003). Tacit knowledge, 
drawing from the work of Michael Polanyi, relates to experiential knowledge and lies 
in ȁimperfectly accessible conscious thoughtȂ (Nelson and Winter, 1982:79) namely 
intuition and perceptive abilities (Polanyi, 1966). It is distinct from explicit knowledge 
which can be coded, meaning knowledge can be structured into identifiable rules and 
relationships that can be communicated and articulated easily (Kogut and Zander, 
1993) and this knowledge is alienable from the code writer. Popper (1972) indicated 
that codified knowledge can be abstracted and stored in the objective world, and 
shared and understood through faceless communication. 
However, codification can never be complete as some knowledge remains sticky in a 
local context, thus limiting the efficiency of transferring knowledge (Gertler, 2003). 
This raises issues about the codification process, and therefore if codes do not leave 
room for interpretation (and in extension slight ambiguity), they create an inertia in 
knowledge production (Ancori et al., 2000; Kogut and Zander, 1992). To prevent 
inertia in knowledge creation, accumulating tacit and explicit knowledge is critical 
(ibid). Thus, for formal small-scale innovations to be performed efficiently, they have 
to be adapted or repurposed in line with the specific contexts of innovators (Cozzens 
and Sutz, 2012, Kaplinsky et al., 2009). Thus, we look at learning as a continuum, 
wherein tacit are those forms of knowledge that are accumulated by the self, be it 
through personal experience ȱ ȁ¢Ȃȱ ȱ ; while explicit forms of 
learning is accrued through direct transfer, learning by seeing, imitation and learning-
by-doing which position themselves at various points in the continuum. Therefore, in 
this paper we consider explicit knowledge overlaps to varying degrees with tacit 
knowledge ȱ ȱ ȱ  ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁ¡Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
codification, whilst ¢ȱ ȁ¢Ȃȱ personal experiences or conscious thought are 
classified as tacit. 
In sum, small-scale innovation can be complex and multi-faceted. It relates to 
¢ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ ȱȱ ȁȂȱ ȱ
diffused in the value chain. Furthermore, it may be driven by linkages and learnings 
which differ within value chains. The 3L framework of learning, labels (certifications) 
ȱȱǻ ȱȱ Ǽȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȁȂȱȱȱ
participation in GVCs as well as performing small-scale innovations. ǰȱȱřȂȱ
are clearly driving factors that impact innovation and its implementation, along with 
value chains. However, before we delve into the different factors that bring out the co-
constituted and endogenous relationship between value chains and innovation, we 
first need to outline a novel procedure to measure and aggregate innovation Ȯ the task 
of the next section.  
3. Measuring small-scale innovation 
To date, there have been few attempts at  measuring small-scale innovations, with 
most studies relying on qualitative methods (George et al., 2012)  while quantitative 
measurements have been adopted more for disruptive innovations (Cozzens and Sutz, 
2012, Zanello et al., 2015). Some have indirectly attempted to measure innovation in 
developing countries, by using proxies such as capacity, technological capabilities, 
human capital or infrastructure (World Bank 2010).  However, such studies have 
primarily explored innovation in Northern contexts, and there is a risk that the 
variables chosen may be less applicable in Southern countries. 
We measure innovation drawing on the innovation system literature, particularly the 
so-ȱ ȁ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ (Lundvall, 1992). In this 
perspective, small-scale innovation emerges as a cumulative outcome from multiple 
activities in a sector. Innovation is measured in four steps and depicted in Figure I:  
x Level 1: The first level (the bottom most rung of the figure) identifies specific 
tasks we call innovation activities. These include the different small-scale 
innovations that are performed by farmers such as building makeshift 
greenhouses during rainy seasons or calibrating pesticide application tools to 
reduce wastage of pesticides and thus reduce overall costs. These activities are 
elicited through in-depth interviews with farmers and other relevant actors in 
the chain.   
x Level 2: The next level up we aggregate inter-related innovation activities into 
specific innovation components. 
innovation activities related to water conservation for instance, be it making 
furrows, hand dug wells, roof top rain water harvesting, filling water tanks, 
which are incremental and related, they are all grouped under a specific 
innovation component. This helps unpack the key type of motivation or 
pressure related to each innovation activity. We use a version of principal 
component analysis to do this, which is explained in the subsequent 
paragraphs. These innovation components can be performed by both LVC and 
GVC farmers.  
x Level 3: However, there can be multiple categories of innovation components 
as overall motivations for performing innovations can vary significantly. To 
explicate motivations that are linked to performing innovations linked to 
participation in value chains, we further aggregate the innovation components 
to form a the third level of innovation types. Thus, innovation components are 
categorized into formal and informal innovations. We achieve this by once 
again using a principal component analysis on innovation components to 
collapse the data into these two innovation types.  
The two main innovation types are: 1). Innovation from external pressures or 
those that are relatively exogenous to the farmer, which we refer to as ȁȂǲȱ
2). Local or more indigenous and adaptive forms of innovation that are 
ȁȂ. This division reflects our previous discussion on the structural 
differences of innovation in agriculture. It is important to note that these are by 
no means representative of all the types of possible innovations, but are 
designed to explore different ends of the innovation spectrum.  
x Level 4: Finally, it is possible to aggregate the innovation types up further to 
form an overarching measure of innovation, seen as a cumulative outcome 
from multiple innovation types. This can provide a measurement for innovation 
within a sector, for instance in our case fresh fruits. In a sense, this overarching 
measure can be used as a tool to compare across sectors to understand the 
complexity of innovations.  
While determining sector wide innovativeness is useful, this paper stops at level three, the 
innovation types, as it endeavours to nuance the structural differences of innovation in 
agriculture for farmers in GVCs and LVCs. It should be noted that each innovation activity 
is not necessarily equal in terms of the level and difficulty of innovation. Small scale 
adaptations are likely easier to learn and use, whilst large scale disruptive activities 
require greater resources and learning. Nevertheless, overall innovation is seen as the 
cumulative effect of small scale innovations over time that can cause more disruptive 
effects (Gault, 2010). In this study, we unpack innovations in accordance with the 
innovation types. This measure of innovation is fluid and the levels can be increased 
or decreased depending on the granularity of analysis required and the quality of data 
available.  
To measure formal and informal innovation as the cumulation of innovation 
components and activities, we use polychoric principal component analysis 
(Kolenikov and Angeles 2004).  Polychoric principal component analysis (PCA), is a 
common process of aggregation as it primarily reduces the number of dimensions (in 
our case innovation activities and components) and creates principal components that 
extract the most information from all the variables. Generally, the first principal 
component is used as a proxy for the common information contained in the variables 
corresponding to each innovation type. The results were then rescaled between the 
value 0 and 1, where 0 is the lowest level of formal/ informal innovation and 1 the 
highest.  
In order to operationalise the innovation measures, we compare innovation activities 
amongst farmers participating in global value chains (GVC) versus those in local value 
chains (LVC). By doing this we are able to gauge the heterogeneous differences for 
farmers across these different chains. It also provides us with a basis for broad 
understanding of ȱȱȃȂȄȱȱ ȱȱin section 2. 
4. Research strategy  
It is important to note that there are clear systematic differences between farmers 
supplying into GVCs versus LVCs. Therefore, how GVC farmers innovate is also 
likely to differ from LVC farmers, especially if participation in GVCs is determined by 
very similar factors. We cannot assume uniform impacts across farmers, as it conceals 
interaction between value chain choice and other factors influencing innovations, 
leading to inaccurate conclusions. Since farmers self-select into value chains, it is likely 
that the coefficient that explains impact of GVC participation on formal/informal 
innovations may be biased. More so when some GVC farmers may be more efficient 
and perform more formal innovations anyway, and thus the innovation effect may be 
overestimated. To correct for this, it is possible to use a Heckman selection model but 
this model which still assumes that the innovation function would differ only by a 
constant term between GVC farmers and non-GVC farmers. However, in reality the 
interaction may be more systematic, as some of the variables may affect both 
participation and innovation. Maertens and Swinnen (2009) have used propensity 
score matching, which helps unpack some systematic differences but only based on 
observables. In our model, we claim that unobservable factors simultaneously 
influence farȂȱ ȱ ȱ 	ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ǰȱ
motivation to be stewards, care for their farmlands, individual skills. The switching 
regression (Maddala, 1983) helps account for this.  Using an endogenous switching 
regression model treats each value chain as a regime and allows for structural 
differences between farmers innovating in global versus local value chains. Similar 
methods have been used by Rao and Qaim (2011) when studying structural 
differences in incomes and participation across farmers selling into regional 
supermarkets and traditional chains.  
We fit a model where participation in a value chain is a binary choice decision made 
by farmers, who try to maximize  profits (or utility). Utility is determined by a set of 
variables Z, which influence farmer capability, learning and costs (e.g. standards) 
linked to adjusting to new value chains i.e.  the ȁřLȂ variables along with control 
variables. However, these variables, Z, may also impact the innovation processes of 
farmers as well. Thus, decisions for farmers to participate in a GVC or LVC market 
occur through comparison of expected utility for GVC participation *gI  against 
expected utility of LVC *lI . So only when 
* *
g lI I! will the benefits of participating in a 
GVC outweigh the constraints. *gI and *lI  are latent variables, only actual participation 
in a GVC is  observed ȁIȂȱǲȱ ȱ 1I  if * *g lI I!  and 0I   if  * *g lI Id  . Thus, participating 
in a GVC is represented as:  
I Z vD                                                                                                                          (1) 
here, D  is a vector of parameters, v  is error term with 0 mean and variance 2V . As 
farmers have heterogeneous characteristics, some farmers self-select into GVCs while 
others enter into LVCs.  
Since it is possible that performing innovations are also possibly influenced by similar 
factors, it is possible to hypothesize that GVC participation leads to increased 
innovation performance and adoption. Thus, a simple model would entail:  
y X I uE J                                                                                                                (2) 
Where y  is innovation type index, X is a vector of 3L variables of interest and controls, 
and I is the participation dummy. The coefficient y  captures impact of GVC 
participation on formal and informal innovation types.  
Since we posit that there are systematic differences across GVC farmers and LVC 
farmers, i.e. ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ řȂȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ rmal and informal 
innovations, this econometric model discussed in Maddala (1986) treats each type of 
value chain as a regime shifter i.e. moving from participating in a GVC as regime 1 to 
an LVC as regime 2, which is represented as follows: 
*
,
,
,
g g g
l l l
y X u
y X u
I Z v
E
E
D
 
 
 
                                                                                                              (3) 
Where gy  and ly  represent innovation type index for GVC and LVC farmers. 
*I is a 
latent variable determining which regime applies (forming the selection equation). gE
and lE  are parameters which will be estimated. Even though variables in vector X and 
Z overlap, proper identification requires that at least one variable in Z not appear in 
X.  gu , lu  and v  are residuals that are contemporaneously correlated- i.e. jointly 
normally distributed with mean 0.  
gy is only observed for the subsample of GVC farmers and ly  for the LVC farmers, 
only iy  is totally observed which is defined as:  
*
*
0
0
g
i
l
y if I
y
y if I
­ ! ® d¯
and
*
*
0
0 0
I if I
I
if I
­ ! ® d¯
                                                                (4) 
The covariance matrix of equation 3 is as follows: 
2
2
2
g gl gv
gl l lv
gv lv
V V V
V V V
V V V
§ ·¨ ¸ ¨ ¸¨ ¸© ¹
¦                                                                                                 (5) 
Where var( gu )=
2
gV  and var( lu )= 2lV , var( v)= 2V , cov( gu , lu )= glV , cov( gu , v)= gvV  and 
cov( lu , v)= lvV . The variance of v  is set to 1, since D  is estimable up to a scale factor 
(Rao and Qaim 2010). Also, glV =0, since gy  and ly  cannot be observed together.  
However, there is a need to account for unobserved factors along with observable 
systemic differences. If unobserved factors are significant, then the error terms of the 
regime equation and the selection equation will be correlated, suggesting endogeneity 
exists. Thus if gvV = lvV =0 then there is exogenous switching, but it either gvV  or lvV are 
non-zero then there is endogenous switching (Maddala, 1986). The significance of the 
correlation coefficients between gu and v is gvU ,  computed as gv
g v
V
V V ; and between  
lu  and v  is lvU , computed as lv
l v
V V V   (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004), are tested. This will 
suggest that both GVC participation and innovation types are endogenous and could 
be affected by each other. By using the correlations, we can calculate the expected 
values of the truncated error terms as:  
( )( | 1) ( | ) ,( )g g gv gv g
ZE u I E u v Z
Z
M D VD V V OI D V  !                                                       (6) 
( )( | 0) ( | )
1 ( )l l gv lv l
ZE u I E u v Z
Z
M D VD V V OI D V  d                                                          (7) 
Where M  is probability density and I  is cumulative density function of standard 
normal distribution. These densities form gO  and lO , which are the Inverse Mills Ratios 
(IMR) evaluated at ZD .  
If a correlation between equation (6) and (7) exists, a two-stage model can be 
calculated. The IMR can be calculated from the first stage probit and then included in 
equation (3).  
An alternate to this is a more efficient method that uses a full information maximum 
likelihood (FIML) procedure, which jointly estimates the selection and regime 
equations following Lokshin and Sajaia (2004). The co-efficients gE  and  lE  in 
equation (3) measure the marginal effects on covariates on innovations unconditional 
on farmers in GVCs or LVCs. However, since there are covariates similar in X and Z, 
the coefficients can be used to estimate conditional effects, so as to measure direct 
effect of mean on gy  and the other part is indirect effect from VC participation as a 
result of correlation between unobserved components of  gy and I.  We use this FIML 
procedure in this paper, while using the 2 steps as a check for robustness.  
We complement the results of this quantitative analysis with interviews, both as a 
form of triangulation and to enrich the results. The data used in this study emerges 
from survey research of 579 horticultural farmers growing peas, mango and avocado 
collected February 2015-April 2015, conducted as part of a wider project exploring the 
activities of small-scale farmers in Kenya. The survey instrument was constructed 
from knowledge built on interviews (during October 2014-Dec 2014), with farmers 
selling into global and local markets, county governments, brokers, Kenyan export 
companies, Horticultural Crops Directorate, Kenyan horticulture business 
associations and NGOs; and was piloted in Jan2015.   
A multi- stage sampling procedure was conducted to compare across global and local 
farmers. To determine whether farmers participated in global or local chains, the 
survey recorded all the markets farmers participated in. If they sold more than half 
their crop produce to a specific buyer they were classified as being in that chain.  At 
the outset, a sampling frame was developed by collating data across multiple sources 
in the global (e.g. HCD traceability lists, Kenyan Export company lists) and local value 
chain (e.g. county government officials, area officers, snowball sampling through 
community members) to create a sampling universe. From the universe the data was 
stratified by county to identify hotspots of farmer density i.e. the main county 
(MuranȂǰȱǼȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱǯȱȱȱȱ
county- lists, farmers were picked at random (without replacement), while ensuring 
that each farmer sampled sells into a specific end market. To correct for oversampling 
we followed Deaton (1997), where sampling weights were calculated as the inverse 
inclusion probabilities. These inverse inclusion probabilities were calculated at two 
stages. The first stage involved weighting the sampling areas (counties) by total 
number of farmers (to ensure that a proportional sample is selected) and the second 
calculating a conditional probability (given a specific county) that the farmer selected 
is either on the export or local list. From the 579 farmers surveyed, a subset of 320 
farmers growing avocados and mangoes were selected.   
  
5. Results: The Kenyan case 
In Kenya, the high value fresh fruit and vegetable (FFV) sector has grown annually at 
a rate of 10-12% in the last decade to emerge as one of the foremost foreign exchange 
earners in the agricultural sector (Krishnan, 2017). Demand for FFV is continuously 
growing, both on the export and regional front, as evidenced by an increase of over 
30% in area under horticultural crops between 2000-2013 (HCDA, 2016). 
The most prominent export fruits are mangos and avocados, which make up over 80% 
of all fruit exports from the country, with almost 40% of mangoes and 60% of all 
avocados exported (authors' calculations based on HCDA, 2016). The production 
process of both these tree crops are similar and thus comparable. Farmers were 
sampled from Meru ǻŚŝƖȱȱ ȱ Ǽȱ ȱȂȱ ¢ȱ ǻśřƖȱȱ Ǽ. 
Ȃȱ as selected as it is the largest exporter of avocados in the country and the 
third largest for Mangoes (HCDA, 2016), while Meru is a major supplier of mangoes 
(ibid).  
5.1 GVC and LVC farmer characteristics 
Table I outlines the characteristics of GVC (n = 132) and LVC (n = 188) farmers. It shows 
that, on average, farmers sold over 80% of their produce into a single value chain 
suggesting that whilst diversification was present, it was possible to clearly 
differentiate between these two value chains. GVC farmers appeared to be selling to 
their current buyers for approximately 6 years, with local farmers selling to buyers on 
average 8 years. However, interview results suggested that the length of time of 
participating in a specific chain did not necessarily encourage trust as many GVC 
farmers feared overdue payments and high rejection from buyers (Interview: #7k #8k). 
GVC farmers had almost double the rejections of LVC farmers, highlighting the 
stringency of standards in global chains.  
Another way this paper measures trust is through the existence of written contracts. 
The data reveals that about 51% of GVC farmers had written contracts, while the 
remaining had oral (relied on word of mouth) or none; starkly different to the LVC 
case where less than 1% had written contracts. Many GVC farmers interviewed 
claimed that a contract gave their work more legitimacy and they would have a stable 
market to sell their produce to (Interview: Farmer 4k,9k). We used an asset index as a 
proxy for incomei. The results were scaled between 0 and 1, with 0 suggesting no assets 
and 1 the most assets. As can be seen, GVC farmers held slightly higher assets than 
those in LVC, although the difference was perhaps not as pronounced as one might 
expect. Dannenberg and Lakes (2013), for example, postulated that farmers who use 
ICT have higher chances of participation in a GVC and innovate more. 
GVC farmers also tended to be better organized into farmer groups compared to LVC 
farmers. The reason for the relatively high organization of GVC farmers was 
attributed to the need to sell specific volumes to global buyers that were mentioned 
within contracts. Moreover, such a formation was reported to reduce the overall costs 
of logistics for lead firms, as well as to facilitate the disbursement of knowledge within 
farmer groups.  
5.2  Small-scale formal and informal innovations 
Drawing on the approach to measure innovation outlined in section 3, we highlight 
the innovation activities which form the basis of the measurements. Table II and Table 
III ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȃȄȱ
ȱȃȄȱ innovation types respectively. In line with the literature review that 
positions innovation as an incremental process of change and learning, the lists of 
activities include both novel activities undertaken by farmers, as well as imitative and 
contextual adaptations. The tables also highlight the responses amongst farmers 
participating in GVC and LVC. The results indicate that GVC farmers tend to perform 
innovation activities that are more formal (technical) compared to LVC farmers, while 
both groups of farmers perform informal activities to relatively similar levels.  
Formal innovation indicates the importance to GVC farmers of the requirements 
related to irrigation processes and waste management. These are selected because 
interviews with farmers indicated that buyers were most concerned about issues 
relating to irrigation and waste management, and thus farmers had to perform 
considerable innovations to meet buyer criteria. Furthermore, waste management and 
irrigation processes are encoded within international standards such as GlobalGAP, 
and need to be adhered to in order to receive certifications. In contrast, informal 
innovations are more bottom up and adaptive in nature; and the differences are less 
striking in magnitude. For instance, innovation activities 3.4 and 4.4, related to 
preparing for unseasonal rains and conserving water, are performed to very similar 
magnitudes by both LVC and GVC farmers. Interviews with GVC and LVC farmers 
elucidated that they had to adapt to climate variability and extremes as it would 
impact the quality of the crop, cause higher rejection levels and reduce their income. 
Thus, farmers innovated to prevent loss of livelihoods (Interview: Farmers #2k, #4k). 
We then aggregated innovation activity to innovation component level, using the 
principal component method discussed above. Table IV, shows the aggregated results 
of each innovation type by GVC and LVC farmer. The values are scaled between 0 and 
1. The findings clearly re-iterate what has been discussed that GVC farmers perform 
more formal and informal innovations, which are indeed significantly different from 
LVC farmers. However, the magnitude of difference is quite stark for formal 
innovations, while much less in the case of informal. The results of the t-test further 
re-enforce that there are significant differences between GVC and LVC farmer formal 
innovations and informal innovations.  
ȱřȂ of value chains and innovation 
In this section,  ȱ¡ȱȱȱȃȂȄȱȮ labels, linkage and learning related to value 
chains and innovation. In this research, the two main types of standards that we 
explore are GlobalGAP, which is an international food safety standard, used by over 
90% of FFV exporters from Kenya (GlobalGAP, 2016); and the Kenyan Horticultural 
Crops Directorate Code of Conduct, which set up its first code of conduct as a 
memorandum of understanding between the buyer and the seller in 1995. The HCD 
and business associations together attempted to develop local standards that included 
ȱǰȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ ȱȱ ȱ ȁȱ
ȂȱȱȁȂȱȱȱǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱ
competitive within export markets (Tallontire et al., 2011). Thus, by 2010, this standard 
evolved into a stripped-down version of GlobalGAP. Thus local codes seem to evolve 
from international standards rather than from local indigenous interpretations. In 
terms of labels, Table V identifies that only 18.6% of LVC farmers adhere to standards 
while almost 65% of GVC farmers are currently GlobalGAP certified. Indeed, in 
interviews, many of the remaining 35% of GVC farmers follow requirements of 
GlobalGAP even though they are not certified by it.  
Linkages are aggregated into backward and forward linkages of network 
relationships. In the survey farmers were asked to rank the quality of their 
relationships as strong, weak or intermediate (between strong and weak). The ties 
were proxied by the frequency and timeliness of help they received from input 
suppliers and buyers and if it engendered trust. Farmers were asked if they had access 
to all inputs and information relating to standards from other actors in the value chain 
and whether they trusted the individuals they received inputs from and sold to. 
Appendix 1 provides a breakdown of the linkages. The findings are represented as an 
index value scaled between 0 and 1, where values closer to 0 are closer to overarching 
weak relationships/linkages, while 1 are strong relationships, and the values closer to 
the mean would be considered intermediateI. The average index value of GVC farmers 
(0.625) is higher than LVC farmers (0.433) and, according to t-tests, these values are 
significantly different from each other, suggesting that GVC farmers have more 
supportive and helpful relationships overall compared to LVC farmers. This implies 
that GVC farmers with stronger linkages could potentially perform more complex 
formal innovations than LVC farmers. Informal innovations, being adaptive 
processes, would not necessarily require as strong linkages. 
 The 3rd ȁȂȱǰȱ ȱȱȱ, clearly shows that GVC farmers have higher 
explicit learning and are thus able to perform formal innovations. The interviews 
indicated that this was because they had to comply with certification requirements 
and thus are more likely to actively seek or be provided support by virtue of 
participating in a GVC. This type of motivation and support is less readily available 
for LVC farmers and hence we see a higher percentage of them adopting more tacit 
modes of learning. However, in the case of informal innovations, tacit learning is far 
higher than explicit learning. We can attribute this to the fact that contextual 
uncertainties including climate and livelihood risks often require incremental 
innovations which are not prescribed within training or standards. 
Our survey allowed us to dig deeper into the modes of learning in table VI. Imitation 
for formal innovations is significantly different between GVC and local farmers.  This 
suggests that GVC farmers tend to imitate more because they perform more complex 
requirements than LVC farmers. In comparison, informal innovations are self-driven, 
and therefore imitation is helpful here. It appears that GVC farmers tend to imitate 
best practices more than LVC farmers. Learning through face-to-face interactions to 
perform formal innovations is much higher for GVC farmers as their linkages are 
stronger and denser. Whilst direct transfer for local farmers is rare, local farmers 
reported that agricultural extension officers and NGOs did not provide them with any 
training or demonstrations. When considering informal innovations, direct face to face 
learning was found to be almost non-existent. This is consistent with our definition, 
suggesting that these innovations grow out of tacit knowledge, and that explicit 
knowledge does not necessarily promote informal innovations as much.   
These findings on learning mechanisms highlight the key underlying characteristics 
of the different innovation types across distinct value chains. Formal innovations are 
closely linked to GVCs, and thus tend to be most likely to occur amongst more 
connected GVC farmers and through more direct and organised modes of learning. 
Informal innovations are less formally specified, and appear to be important across all 
farmers. An important note to mention is that we find that learning and linkages are 
intrinsically related and cannot be easily separated. Therefore, we will attempt to 
interact the terms in order to get a nuanced understanding of the effects of learning and 
linkages. The last 3 rows in table VI depict the interacted terms of linkages with tacit 
and explicit knowledge. The t-test results indicate that there are significant differences 
between GVC farmer linkages and tacit/explicit knowledge when performing formal 
and informal innovations. Thus, in the econometric models presented in the next 
section, we unpack in greater depth why the tacit learning and linkages, as well as 
explicit learning and linkages, terms vary across farmers. 
This section has elucidated the systematic differences between GVC and LVC farmers, 
suggesting that GVC farmers tend to innovate more, have more explicit forms of 
learning, stronger linkages, adhere to labels and are endowed with more productive 
assets compared to LVC farmers. The next section will quantitatively examine how 
performing formal and informal innovations differs across farmers in GVCs and LVCs 
and to what extent the řȂ impact these innovation types. 
6 The dynamic relationship between value chain participation and 
innovation: Estimation results  
The descriptive analysis in the previous sections reveals that there are significant 
differences across farmers who are in GVCs and LVCs in terms of performing formal 
and informal innovations. ȱ¢ȱȱȁ¡Ȃȱof these differences, we deconstruct 
the relationship between innovation and value chain participation, using the 
endogenous switching regression model as discussed in section 3. Appendix 2 
provides a summary of the key variable used in the regression. As shown in Table VII, 
two separate endogenous switching regression models were run which are discussed 
in the following sections. 
6.1 Value chain participation and formal innovations 
Determinants of participation in GVCs (selection equation Model 1) 
The results of the section equation (determinants of participation in a GVC) are briefly 
explained in this section. The regression results are displayed in table VIII. Column 
(3) and (4) are the co-efficient and standard errors for model 1, while column (1) and 
(2) is an independent probit which is a robustness test for the selection equation in 
model 1. Before interpreting the results, we check for endogeneity of the duration 
variable. We believe that the longer farmers participate in a chain, the higher the 
probability of continuing to participate as exporters would know them better. Thus, 
there might be potentially endogeneity, which would lead to a bias in the coefficient 
estimate. Following the two-stage approach developed by Rivers and Vuong (1988) 
and detailed in Wooldridge (2002) we find that duration is exogenous. 
Farmers who have stronger linkages and use more tacit and explicit forms of learning 
are more likely to participate in a GVC. These findings were supported by interviews 
with farmers where export oriented Ȃȱactively nurture relationships with other 
network actors. Adhering to a certification appears to have a significant and positive 
effect on continuing to participate in a GVC. Thus, clearly the 3Ls are jointly significant 
in driving participation in a GVC.  
The asset index, has a positive and significant effect on being able to continue to 
participate in a GVC. These results are in line with several studies which show that 
capitalized farmers are more likely to be able to participate in GVCs (e.g. Hernandez 
et al., 2007). Having a contract seems to have a positive and significant effect on 
farmersȂ ability to continue to participate in a GVC. Many GVC farmers reported that 
having a written contract gave ȱȱȁȱȱ¢Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȁȂȱ
that their produce would be purchased.    
The data showed the results for being a member of a farmer group as insignificant in 
shaping participation in a GVC. While some farmer groups or communities elect 
public relations heads, who help maintain good relationships with export firms 
(Interview: Farmers #1k #3k), being part of one did not automatically lead to 
participation in a GVC. Interviews suggested that farmer groups did not provide 
equal assistance to all its members, leading to infighting. Group members frequently 
cited the lack of trustworthiness engendered by leaders as a critical issue. This reduced 
cohesiveness leads to low collective efficiency, especially in terms of bargaining for 
better terms of contracts or prices. 
Formal Innovations in GVCs and LVCs: Outcome equation Model 1 
The results in   
Table IX explain the formal innovation types for farmers participating in GVCs and 
LVCs. To properly identify the model (discussed in section 3), two variables in the 
probit (duration and having a written contract) are excluded from this regression, as 
these variables did not affect the innovation measure directlyii. To compare the results 
of this model, we also ran two-stage estimation (with IMR as explained in section 4, 
equation 6 and 7)3. The coefficient estimates were in a similar range, but the FIML 
provides more efficient estimates. The results indicate that there are structural 
differences in how farmers perform formal innovations across value chains and 
further shows that the 3LȂs are the most significant factors that determine innovation 
types and value chain participation. 
Certifications have a positive and significant effect on the levels of innovation amongst 
GVC farmers. Achieving standards is likely one that requires both significant 
incremental small-scale innovations, as well as possibly more disruptive ones. The 
importance of innovating was explained by one GVC farmer:  
ȃThese certifications are costlyǳ I have to be creative in how to make them work for me 
 ȱ ȱǳȱȱȱells you how you can achieve it being creative, they all expect 
big changes like suddenly using drip irrigation.ǯǯȱȱȱȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ
to achieve ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱ ȱȱǳȱȱȱbuild furrows, and use 
sprinklers which are cheaper but alȱȱȄȱǻ: #6k) 
It is interesting to note that the HCD Code of Conduct that is followed by some local 
farmers, has a significantly negative relationship with formal innovations. This means 
that achieving a local standard does not promote innovation, thus questioning the 
extent to which local standards encourage local development.  
The interaction of tacit learning and linkages has a positive and significant effect for 
GVC farmers and promotes performing formal innovations. For GVC farmers, the 
links between tacit learning and formal innovation relate to the ways that innovation 
often requires ȃ Ȅȱȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱ¡ȱ
found in wider discussions related to farmers involves adopting new pesticides in the 
right quantities. In this case, tacit learning was essential for ensuring that the 
maximum residue limit on export quality mangoes and avocados was not 
contravened. Thus, in this case tacit learning impacted the extent to which the produce 
was safe for export to EU. While tacit knowledge was important, the use of it was quite 
ȱȱ	ǰȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȁ¡ȱ¢Ȃȱ
ȱȱȱȱȁȱ ¢Ȃȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
requirements. Thus, the magnitude of effect of tacit knowledge and related linkages 
is far less than explicit knowledge and the requisite linkages.  
For local farmers, the linkages and tacit knowledge variable was not significant in 
engendering formal innovations for several reasons. Interviews with local farmers 
suggested that they did not have to prescribe to stringent standards and never felt the 
ȁȂȱȱȱȱǰȱwhile some also claimed that even if they did try 
to innovate to add someȱ ȁ¡Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ  ȱ ot necessarily be 
remunerated.   
Explicit learning and the related linkages are positive and significant and abet increase 
in performing formal innovations across both GVC and LVC farmers. Direct transfers 
of knowledge are facilitated through trainings and workshops. Interviews with local 
farmers suggested that they benefitted greatly from spillover knowledge they 
received via other GVC farmers, as well as attending demonstrations that GVC 
farmers would hold on their land. This meant that in many ways GVC farmers were 
able to spread their knowledge even if through weaker ties, and cause overall benefit 
in stimulating local formal innovations. This suggests a slow and gradual absorption 
of new incremental practices trickling down across value chains and building 
livelihood resilience for local farmers.  
The asset index appears to be positive and significant for LVC farmers to perform 
formal innovations. This is because local farmers have weak linkages and far less 
explicit knowledge compared to GVC farmers. Therefore, they have to rely 
¢ȱȱȱ ȱȁȂȱȱȱ for the lack of support. Several 
LVC farmers also stated that asset indexes were used as a measure to make up for the 
relative lack of infrastructural facilities in Kenya.  
Rejection levels appear to be positive and significant forces that push GVC farmers to 
perform more formal innovations. We show in Table I that almost 15% of the crop is 
rejected per farmer, which causes significant income losses, as one GVC farmer 
explained:  
ȃ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ǳȱȱȱȱȱȱchanged [adapted] 
growing practice to what I used to follow before [indigenous methods] and now they 
ȱǯǯǯȄȱ Farmer: #7k) 
This points towards the importance of local context in formal innovations, occurring 
through bottom up change. 
Farmer groups appear to be positive and significant in ȱȱȱȂȱȱ
innovations. This means that being a member of a farmer group abets innovation and 
suggest that local groups are more inclusive. These results are starkly opposite to the 
GVC-related farmer groups which seem to be ineffective and exclusionary in terms of 
innovation, because of the lack of sharing of knowledge within the group and the dis-
trust in members. 
The lower part of table IX reports estimates for the covariance terms. The likelihood 
ratio test for joint independence of the selection and innovation equations is 
significant (12.77), suggesting that there is dependence between the equations, and 
highlighting that endogeneity exists. This model was able to control for this through the 
specification. Furthermore, since “legǀ“llv and is significant (following Trost 1981), it 
implies that GVC farmers perform more formal innovations than even if they participated in 
LVCs. Thus, they are more efficient farmers because of their experience of participating 
in a GVC. This re-enforces the links between GVCs and innovation.  
6.2 Value chain participation and informal innovations 
Determinants of global value chain participation: Selection equation model 2 
The results for the selection equation in model 2 are presented in table X below. These 
variables are similar to the selection equation in model 1. The only difference is in the 
variables of tacit and explicit learning which are assigned values according to 
knowledge learnt doing informal innovations, while in model 1, these values were 
linked to formal innovations.  
The results indicate that the interaction variables of tacit learning and related linkages 
and explicit learning and linkages are significant and positive. Since the results are 
similar to model 1, we do not repeat them.  
Informal innovations and value chains: outcome equation model 2 
Results in Table XI (outcome regression) show that certifications have a positive and 
statistically significant effect on both GVC and LVC farmers performing informal 
innovations. It denotes that international certifications and local codes of conduct 
(standards) ȱȱȱȱȂȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱ
could impact their crops. This is interesting as it shows that even though international 
certifications and HCD codes of conduct concentrate on export related good practices, 
they can potentially still promote bottom-up innovations. 
The interaction terms of tacit and explicit learning mechanisms and linkages appear 
to be positive and significant factors that affect informal innovations across GVC and 
LVC farmers. Many researchers have qualitatively discussed the importance of tacit 
learning (e.g. Gereffi et al., 2005, Peitrobelli and Rabelotti, 2011), while many 
quantitative studies have focused primarily on explicit (e.g. Okello et al., 2011). Our 
research suggests both are critical, especially because the effects of tacit-linkages and 
explicit-linkages have similar magnitude of coefficients. The importance of tacit 
knowledge signifies that explicit knowledge alone is not comprehensive enough for 
farmers. This insinuates that knowledge is indeed sticky, and highlights the need for 
bottom-up knowledge to promote not only informal but formal innovations.    
 We are able to empirically show that farmers in GVCs and LVCs perform formal and 
informal innovations differently because the řȂȱeffect each of them in different ways. 
¢ǰȱȱřȂȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
endogenous relationship between value chains and innovations. 
Farmer groups have a contradictory effect on informal innovation in GVCs and LVCs 
compared to formal innovation. It seems that being part of a farmer group has a 
significantly negative effect on informal innovations for both GVC and LVC farmers. 
For LVC farmers this means that learning tacitly seems to be driving performance of 
informal innovations and collective learning through groups is not very helpful. For 
GVC farmers it reveals that being part of a farmer group has a negative effect on 
performing any kind of innovation. Thus, farmer groups need to be revamped 
significantly in order to attain collective efficiency. There is indeed a need to re-think 
what it means for farmer organization and the role it plays in promoting innovations.  
The asset index has a positive and significant effect on informal innovations 
performed by LVC farmers. With low levels of explicit support and poor forward 
linkages, the importance of maintaining and accumulating assets for LVC farmers is 
crucial for them to be able to continue to sell into local markets.   
7 Discussion and conclusion  
This paper seeks to build on recent work which explores the endogenous link between 
participating in value chains and innovation. In that context, we distinctively measure 
small-scale innovations in the agricultural sector, thus integrating a range of different 
innovative activities into a single measure. We develop two small-scale innovation 
types: formal, those linked to standards; and informal which are harder to codify and 
embedded in local contexts.  
In considering the relationship between innovation and value chain participation, we 
consider the 3Ls Ȯ labels, learning and linkages to be crucial. The results suggest that 
adhering to labels increases the possibility of formally innovating, and thus raises 
interesting questions related to using standards as mechanisms to promote different 
forms of innovation and development. We find that farmers involved in GVCs are 
more likely to be involved in formal type innovation compared with those involved 
in local value chains, although some farmers focused on local markets are involved in 
formal innovations. For farmers focused on local markets, the evidence of some 
involved in formal ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱ
farmers who, even without GVC linkages, are able to tactically absorb new practices 
and skills. ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȁȂȱ
farmers grow and what measure can make such activity more widespread. 
 Learning and linkages are the other two key factors that suggest an endogenous 
relationship. The introduction of the notions of explicit learning and tacit learning 
have highlighted the varying nature of learning across farmers and value chains. In 
the GVC case, most innovation occurs due to direct transfers of explicit knowledge 
linked to value chain participation. However, in our research we found that 
community-related linkages also played a crucial role in supporting not only farmers 
in GVCs but also LVCs. Thus, the footprints of often narrow training schemes are not 
solely responsible in prompting innovations, as knowledge spillovers and leakages 
appear to be trickling down to local farmers, building their overall capacity. Results 
ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȁy of 
Ȃȱ ȱ whether spreading knowledge in less formal ways enables quicker 
conversion from explicit to tacit. 
Having found formal innovation to be more prominent for GVC farmers, it is 
noticeable that informal innovation was observed across both GVC and LVC farmers. 
These findings highlight the importance of a range of small-scale, adaptive practices 
that have evolved locally, and which indicate new potential directions for policy and 
civil society action to support resilience building amongst farmers. Such informal 
innovations should not be assumed to ȁ¢ȱ Ȃǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
difficulty in codification and reliance on tacit knowledge. The inability to perform 
informal innovations can cause loss of crop yields and quality and thus reduce sales 
of crops to both global and local buyers, impinging on income. This can potentially 
cause spillover effects onto how formal innovations are performed. Further research 
could explore how informal innovation might be better disseminated, improved and 
learned from so as to maximise its efficacy of local contexts and for pro-poor growth. 
Having focused on small-scale innovation that is adaptive and incremental, this 
research also provides some insights for existing literature on frugal innovation. 
Epistemologically, much of the literature on frugal innovations focuses on top-down 
relationships that are driven by lead firms and which, in an endeavour to be more 
inclusive, attempt to forge interactive and polycentric relationships with local actors 
(Knorringa et al., 2016). Overall, the idea of collaborative growth is entrenched 
(Radjou and Prabhu, 2014). However, such collaborative processes are difficult to 
achieve in GVCs due to skewed power asymmetries, and the lack of involvement of 
ȱȱȱǯȱǰȱ ȱȱȁȂȱ	ǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱ
¡ȱ ȁȂǰȱ ȱȱ s to contested relationships (Nielson and 
Pritchard 2009). Another crucial point to highlight for frugal innovation is the link to 
product innovations. However, farmers in Kenya have to perform several process 
innovations which are informal and tacit in nature. These aspects are still to be 
included within the remit of frugal innovations and highlight a broad set of activities 
responding to changing local contexts (such as climatic shocks) as well as mitigating 
against demands of GVC relationships (such as standards and diffusion of 
problematic top-down innovation). Some of these aspects are less explored in frugal 
innovation, which positions small-ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȁȂȱȱ
and more in terms of a new frontier of challenges and risk for farmers as diffusion of 
novel requirements and innovations make ever greater demands on them. Thus this 
ǰȱ¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȃ ȱ
ȱȱȱȄȱȱȃ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȄ.  
Given the novelty of seeking to measure innovation within agro-value chains, there is 
scope for further research pursuing this agenda. The decisions on selecting what 
innovations to include in the farmer survey was a difficult task. The consideration of 
a wider range of innovation can improve the efficacy of the innovation measure. The 
endogenous link suggests that it is possible to consider both agricultural and 
innovation linked policy. These findings highlight the role of local innovation 
ecosystems in helping to support a move of farmers into international markets by 
ȱ ȱ ȱ řȂǯȱ Thus, policymakers have an opportunity to be able to help 
mutually address both value chain inclusiveness together with innovation through 
focusing on overlapping factors. At the same time, they need to be aware of the 
potential downsides of innovation which may, in some cases, incorporate farmers into 
unstable and subservient relationships with global markets and be less impactful in 
the long run. 
 
NOTES  
1Since the farmers were sampled from similar regions and have similar assets, they can be 
assumed to report relatively comparable strength and weakness of relationships. 
2 Broadly a national innovation system refers to the flow of technology and knowledge within 
a national state or embedded in a nation, by a network of institutions, which abet diffusion 
and uptake of innovations.  
3 Income data attained in the survey was not cross-validated. Asset indexes have been used in 
several studies (e.g. Carter and Barett 2006) as an alternative to income. 
4 Results are not shown due to space constraints 
5 GVC participation is correlated with duration 0.2688 (sig 0.000) and with contracts 0.2593 
(sig 0.000), while formal innovation is correlated with duration 0.0588 (sig 0.3004) and 
contracts 0.0692 (sig=0.200. Falsification tests also suggest removing both variables. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Figure I: Measuring innovativeness (a) Simple measure, (b) Measure using multiple 
innovation types 
 
Source: Authors ? construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table I: Descriptives and differences between farmers by chain participation  
 
Variable Category Variables GVC (n=132) LVC (n=188) 
 
 
Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Value chain participation 
 
 
% sold to current main buyer(s) 83.84* 1.30 86.83 1.02 
% sold to second buyer 12.46* 0.887 9.35 0.760 
Controls Sex (% male in each VC) 78.03** 3.619 68.08 3.463 
Farmer group (1= yes, % of each VC) 71.21*** 4.034 31.91 3.43 
Alternate activity (% of each VC) 84.84** 1.87 90.95 1.669 
Asset Indexa (value) 0.281 0.019 0.182 0.015 
Duration sold to most recent buyer(years) 5.80*** 0.28 7.92 0.36 
Rejection levels (%) 19.46*** 0.49 10.23 0.27 
Contracts: Written (% by VC) 51.51*** 0.43 0.53 0.16 
*Mean value is significantly different from local farmers at 10% level    
** Mean value is significantly different from local farmers at 5% level 
*** Mean value are significantly different from local farmers at 1% level  
a Calculated using PCA, used as a proxy for income, as income data was not validated. The asset index includes, years of education, land size, owning mobile, internet, computer, 
electricity, various modes of transport, TV, radio, house type, access to paved roads 
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Table II: Innovation type- Formal 
Innovation Activity 
(component 1 and 2) 
Formal Innovations  GVC 
n=132 
LVC 
n=188 
Innovation component 1 Waste management   
Innovation activity 1.1 Do you dispose of chemical and inorganic wastes 
through modes of incineration? 
4.62 21.43 
Innovation activity 1.2 Do you dispose of chemical and inorganic wastes 
through pits away from land? 
43.85 41.76 
Innovation activity 1.3 Do you dispose of chemical and inorganic wastes 
through collection points by community initiated 
projects, municipality or exporters? 
45.38 28.02 
Innovation activity 1.4 Do you dispose of chemical and inorganic wastes 
through community initiated septic tanks? 
3.08 0.00 
Innovation component 2 Irrigation mode     
Innovation activity 2.1 Do you build natural furrows/ boreholes to irrigate 
crops? 
4.62 22.53 
Innovation activity 2.2 Do you install sprinklers to irrigate crops? 8.46 36.81 
Innovation activity 2.3 Do you use boreholes/furrows and sprinklers to 
irrigate crops? 
44.62 31.32 
Innovation activity 2.4 Do you switch between drip and natural to irrigate 
crops? 
42.31 7.69 
^ŽƵƌĐĞ ?ƵƚŚŽƌƐ ? construction  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 
 
 
Table III: Innovation type - Informal 
Innovation Activity 
(component 3 and 4) 
Informal incremental innovations  GVC 
n=132 
LVC  
n=188 
Innovation component 3 Climate Variability    
Innovation activity 3.1 During unseasonal rains/ floods do you diversify 
to other livelihoods? 
46.15 60.33 
Innovation activity 3.2 During unseasonal rains/ floods do you dig pads, 
ditches, terraces? 
0.77 1.10 
Innovation activity 3.3 During unseasonal rains/ floods do you create a 
makeshift greenhouse? 
24.62 19.78 
Innovation activity 3.4 During unseasonal rains/ floods are you able to 
do a combination of at least 2? 
16.92 12.75 
Innovation component 4 Water Conservation      
Innovation activity 4.1 Do you conserve water by making small or large 
water pads, ditches or trenches? 
0.77 8.79 
Innovation activity 4.2 Do you conserve water by buying water tanks 
and storing rainwater? 
0.77 3.08 
Innovation activity 4.3 Do you conserve water by setting up roof top 
catchments? 
45.38 29.34 
Innovation activity 4.4 Do you conserve water by performing at least 2 of 
these? 
40.77 34.07 
Source: Authors ? construction  
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Table IV: General differences in Innovation type index of GVC and LVC farmers   
 Innovation Type GVC farmer 
N=132 
LVC farmer 
N=188 
Ttest  
Formal  0.529*** 
(0.017) 
0.351 
(0.008) 
-10.34 
Informal (Adaptive) 0.638** 
(0.019) 
0.521 
(0.016) 
-4.32 
T test results:  
 *Mean value is significantly different from local farmers at 10% level ; ** Mean value is significantly different from local 
farmers at 5% level; *** Mean value are significantly different from local farmers at 1% level  
Values in brackets are standard errors 
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Table V: General differences of labels and linkage between GVC and LVC farmers  
Farmer chain  GVC farmer 
N=132 
LVC farmer 
N=188 
Labels or certifications (1=dummy) (%) 63.63*** 18.61 
Linkage Index1 (value between 0 and 1) 0.625*** 
(0.012) 
0.433 
(0.011) 
T test results: *Mean value is significantly different from local farmers at 10% level ; ** Mean value is significantly different 
from local farmers at 5% level; *** Mean value are significantly different from local farmers at 1% level  
Values in brackets are standard errors 
a=please see appendix 1 for backward and forward linkage breakdown  
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Table VI: Learning in value chains  
 
 Learning mechanisms 
(% share by farmer chain) 
Formal innovations 
  
Informal innovations 
  
Farmer chain  GVC LVC GVC  LVC  
Tacit (average share by farmer category)         
A) Through own cognition  30.60*** 57.26 72.29* 80.11 
  (1.08) (0.90) (1.32) (0.89) 
Explicit (average share by farmer category)     
B) Imitation  9.35** 10.31 4.32** 2.63 
  (0.27) (0.34) (0.45) (0.36) 
C) Knowledge leakage (through community, friends) 6.73* 16.26 16.77*** 12.83 
  (0.36) (0.42) (1.44) (0.42) 
D) Direct transfer, face to face interactions   52.87*** 16.17 6.20 4.39 
  (1.32) (1.04) (0.05) (0.03) 
Total Explicit (B+C+D) (% share by farmer category) 62.95*** 42.74 27.29*** 19.85 
  (1.80) (1.50) (1.12) (0.63) 
Interaction terms      
Tacit* linkages  24.85*** 
(0.95) 
T=-5.48 
17.90 
(0.82) 
32.21** 
(2.65) 
T=-2.73 
18.04 
(1.06) 
Explicit*linkages  25.12*** 
(1.53) 
T=12.41 
6.39 
(0.71) 
11.15*** 
(1.81) 
T=-4.31 
2.88 
(0.62) 
T test results: *Mean value is significantly different from local farmers at 10% level; ** Mean value is significantly different 
from local farmers at 5% level; *** Mean value are significantly different from local farmers at 1% level  
Values in brackets are standard errors 
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Table VII: Endogenous switching regression models 
 
Dependent variable 
in models 
Selection equation  
(jointly estimated probit) 
Outcome equation  
(FIML) 
Model 1 Participating in a GVC Formal innovation type  
Model 2 Participating in a GVC Informal innovation type  
Source: Authors ? construction  
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Formal Innovations:  
 
Table VIII: Selection equation- Probit model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables Independent probit 
GVC farmer; 
Jointly estimated probit 
GVC farmers  
(1) 
Coefficient 
(2) 
SE 
(3) 
Coefficient 
(4) 
SE 
Labels  0.637*** 0.261 0.640*** 0.246 
Tacit learning*linkages 0.024*** 0.010 0.026*** 0.010 
Explicit learning*linkages 0.042*** 0.009 0.040*** 0.009 
Asset Index 1.240*** 0.253 1.338*** 0.235 
Alternate livelihoods -0.817 0.565 -0.870** 0.506 
Sex -0.243 0.235 -0.352 0.246 
Part of farmer group -0.126 0.250 -0.160 0.231 
Rejection Levels 0.288*** 0.075 0.288*** 0.077 
Duration -0.094*** 0.027 -0.090*** 0.023 
Contract 1.475*** 0.293 1.376*** 0.264 
_cons -2.303*** 0.367 -2.305*** 0.378 
 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table IX: Full information maximum likelihood parameters for formal innovations   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*** 
Significance at 1% level 
** Significance at 5% level 
* Significance at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables     Formal GVC Formal: LVC  
(1) 
Coefficient 
(2) 
SE 
(3) 
Coefficient 
(4) 
SE 
Labels  0.100*** 0.021 -0.044*** 0.022 
Tacit learning*linkages 0.003*** 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
Explicit learning*linkages 0.007*** 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 
Asset Index -0.006 0.025 0.075*** 0.026 
Alternate livelihoods -0.021 0.041 0.016 0.041 
Sex -0.005 0.022 0.009 0.016 
Part of farmer group 0.017 0.021 -0.036** 0.017 
Rejection Levels -0.013** 0.007 0.005 0.006 
_cons 0.273*** 0.049 0.347*** 0.021 
ůŶʍŐ -2.263*** 0.067   
ɆŐǀ -0.463** 0.199   
ůŶʍů   -2.251*** 0.057 
Ɇůǀ   0.732** 0.115 
>ŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚƌĂƚŝŽƚĞƐƚŽĨ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ࿴ ? 
12.77*** 
Number of observations 320 
Log-likelihood 201.29 
Wald chi2(13) 260.95*** 
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Informal innovations:  
Table X: Selection equation - probit model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Independent probit 
GVC farmer;  
Jointly estimated probit 
GVC farmers  
(1) 
Coefficient 
(2) 
SE 
(3) 
Coefficient 
(4) 
SE 
Labels  0.945*** 0.232 0.629*** 0.217 
Tacit learning*linkages 0.028*** 0.007 0.044*** 0.007 
Explicit learning*linkages 0.028*** 0.008 0.031*** 0.008 
Asset Index 1.241*** 0.256 1.033*** 0.229 
Alternate livelihoods -0.510 0.547 -0.162 0.482 
Sex -0.123 0.228 -0.185 0.221 
Part of farmer group -0.098 0.251 0.013 0.207 
Rejection Levels 0.349*** 0.078 0.301*** 0.070 
Duration -0.105*** 0.027 -0.060** 0.028 
Contract 1.385*** 0.276 0.800*** 0.284 
_cons -2.280*** 0.346 -2.658*** 0.355 
 
*significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1% 
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Table XI: Full information maximum likelihood parameters for informal innovations   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance at 1% level 
** Significance at 5% level 
* Significance at 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Variables     Informal: GVC Informal: LVC  
(1) 
Coefficient 
(2) 
SE 
(3) 
Coefficient 
(4) 
SE 
Labels  0.057* 0.033 0.015 0.041 
Tacit learning*linkages 0.003*** 0.001 0.011*** 0.001 
Explicit learning*linkages 0.005*** 0.001 0.012*** 0.002 
Asset Index -0.066* 0.040 -0.026 0.057 
Alternate livelihoods -0.079 0.070 0.106* 0.064 
Sex -0.006 0.037 -0.040 0.025 
Part of farmer group -0.058** 0.034 -0.050* 0.026 
Rejection Levels -0.010 0.011 -0.005 0.012 
_cons 0.663*** 0.072 0.330*** 0.038 
ůŶʍŐ -1.668*** 0.074   
ɆŐǀ -0.934** 0.061   
ůŶʍů   -1.865*** 0.055 
Ɇůǀ   0.055 0.515 
>ŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚƌĂƚŝŽƚĞƐƚŽĨ
ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚĞƋƵĂƚŝŽŶƐ࿴ ? 
15.40*** 
Number of observations 320 
Log-likelihood 49.57 
Wald chi2(13) 57.77*** 
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Appendix 1: Linkages - Breakdown of relationships  
Actors Relationship of farmer with actors GVC LVC 
Seed suppliers 0= Weak (% of each farmer category) 2.68 0.41  
1=Intermediate (% of each farmer category) 63.6 50  
2=Strong (% of each farmer category) 33.72 49.59 
Agro-vets 0= Weak (% of each farmer category) 4.6 7.41  
1=Intermediate (% of each farmer category) 51.72 62.3  
2=Strong (% of each farmer category) 43.68 29.59 
Local Credit givers 0= Weak (% of each farmer category) 3.45 0.00  
1=Intermediate (% of each farmer category) 90.42 88.21  
2=Strong (% of each farmer category) 6.13 11.79 
Extension officers 0= Weak (% of each farmer category) 12.2 44.83  
1=Intermediate (% of each farmer category) 47.56 36.78  
2=Strong (% of each farmer category) 40.24 18.39 
Main buyers 
(exporters for GVC 
farmers and local 
buyers for LVC) 
0= Weak (% of each farmer category) 19.51 54.39 
1=Intermediate (% of each farmer category) 44.31 24.72 
2=Strong (% of each farmer category) 33.74 20.88 
Brokers 0= Weak (% of each farmer category) 31.42 19.51  
1=Intermediate (% of each farmer category) 50.57 36.99  
2=Strong (% of each farmer category) 14.56 8.54 
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Appendix 2: Summary of variables used in regression 
 
 
 
i  
ii  
                                                 
Variables  Variable explanation  Stage 1 
regression 
Stage 2 regression  
Labels   Having a local code of conduct or 
international certification 
dummy; values in % 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Tacit 
learning*linkages 
Interaction of total share of tacit 
learning with index of 
backward/forward linkages 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Explicit 
learning*linkages 
Interaction of total share of 
explicit learning with index of 
backward/forward linkages 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Asset Index Index of assets possessed before 
participation in current chain  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Alternate 
livelihoods 
Other livelihoods possessed 
dummy; values in % 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Sex male dummy; values in % Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Part of farmer 
group 
Membership if farmer group 
dummy; values in %  
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Rejection Levels Dummy for if they have 
rejections; values in % 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Duration Number of years in specific chain  Yes 
 
No 
Contract Dummy if they have a contract 
with main buyer  
Yes 
 
No  
Dependent 
variables  
 Binary variable 
GVC farmer or not 
Index of formal 
innovations; Index 
of informal 
innovations  
